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Abstract
We revisit the notion of individual fairness first proposed by Dwork et al. [2012], which asks
that “similar individuals should be treated similarly”. A primary difficulty with this definition
is that it assumes a completely specified fairness metric for the task at hand. In contrast, we
consider a framework for fairness elicitation, in which fairness is indirectly specified only via a
sample of pairs of individuals who should be treated (approximately) equally on the task. We
make no assumption that these pairs are consistent with any metric. We provide a provably
convergent oracle-efficient algorithm for minimizing error subject to the fairness constraints,
and prove generalization theorems for both accuracy and fairness. Since the constrained pairs
could be elicited either from a panel of judges, or from particular individuals, our framework
provides a means for algorithmically enforcing subjective notions of fairness. We report on
preliminary findings of a behavioral study of subjective fairness using human-subject fairness
constraints elicited on the COMPAS criminal recidivism dataset.
1 Introduction
Individual Fairness for algorithmic decision making was originally formulated as the compelling
idea that “similar individuals should be treated similarly” by Dwork et al. [2012]. In its original
formulation, “similarity” was determined by a task-specific metric on individuals, which would be
provided to the algorithm designer. Since then, the formulation of this task-specific fairness met-
ric has been the primary obstacle that has stood in the way of adoption and further development
of this conception of individual fairness. This is for two important reasons:
1. First, although people might have strong intuitions about what kinds of decisions are unfair,
it is difficult for them to distill these intuitions into a concisely defined quantitative measure.
2. Second, different people disagree on what constitutes “fairness”. There is no reason to sus-
pect that even if particular individuals were able to distill their intuitive notions of fairness
into some quantitative measure, that those measures would be consistent with one another,
or even internally consistent.
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In this work, we propose a practical but rigorous approach aimed at circumventing this diffi-
culty, while staying close to the original idea that “similar individuals should be treated similarly”.
We are motivated by the following idea: Even if people cannot distill their conception of fairness
as a quantitative metric, they can still be asked to express their opinion about whether particular
pairs of individuals should be treated similarly or not. Thus, one could choose a panel of “judges”,
or even a particular person, and elicit opinions from them about whether certain pairs of decisions
were fair or not. There is no reason to suspect that these pairwise opinions will be consistent in
any sense, or that they will form a metric. Nevertheless, once such a set of pairwise fairness con-
straints has been elicited, and once a data distribution and hypothesis class are fixed, there is a
well-defined learning problem: minimize classification error subject to the constraint that the vi-
olation of the specified pairs is held below some fixed threshold. By varying this threshold, we
can in principle define a Pareto frontier of classifiers, optimally trading off error with the elicited
conception of individual fairness — without ever having to commit to a restricted class of fairness
notions. We would like to find the classifiers that realize this Pareto frontier. In this paper, we
solve the computational, statistical, and conceptual issues necessary to do this, and demonstrate
the effectiveness of our approach via a behavioral study.
1.1 Results
Our Model We model individuals as having features in X and binary labels, drawn from some
distribution P . A committee of judges1 u ∈ U has preferences that certain individuals should be
treated the same way by a classifier — i.e. that the probability that they are given a positive label
should be the same. We represent these preferences abstractly as a set of pairs Cu ⊆ X × X for
each judge u, where (x,x′) ∈ Cu represents that judge u would view it as unfair if individuals x and
x′ were treated substantially differently (i.e. given a positive classification with a substantially
different probability). We impose no structure on how judges form their views, or the relationship
between the views of different judges — i.e. the sets {Cu}u∈U are allowed to be arbitrary (for
example, they need not satisfy a triangle inequality), and need not be mutually consistent. We
write C = ∪uCu .
We then formulate a constrained optimization problem, that has two different “knobs” with
which we can quantitatively relax our fairness constraint. Suppose that we say that a γ-fairness
violation corresponds to classifying a pair of individuals (x,x′) ∈ C such that their probabilities of
receiving a positive label differ by more than γ (our first knob): |E [h(x)− h(x′)]| ≤ γ . In this expres-
sion, the expectation is taken only over the randomness of the classifier h. We might ask that for no
pair of individuals do we have a γ-fairness violation: max(x,x′)∈C |E [h(x)− h(x′)]| ≤ γ . On the other
hand, we could ask for the weaker constraint that over a random draw of a pair of individuals, the ex-
pected fairness violation is at most η (our second knob): E(x,x′)∼P 2 [|h(x)− h(x′)| ·1 [(x,x′) ∈ C]] ≤ η.
We can also combine both relaxations to ask that the in expectation over random pairs, the “ex-
cess” fairness violation, on top of an allowed budget of γ , is at most η. Subject to these constraints,
we would like to find the distribution over classifiers that minimizes classification error: given a
setting of the parameters γ and η, this defines a benchmark with which we would like to compete.
1Though we develop our formalism as a committee of judges, note that it permits the special case of a single subjec-
tive judge, which we make use of in our behavioral study.
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Our Theoretical Results Even absent fairness constraints, learning to minimize 0/1 loss (even
over linear classifiers) is computationally hard in the worst case (see e.g. Feldman et al. [2012,
2009]). Despite this, learning seems to be empirically tractable in most cases. To capture the
additional hardness of learning subject to fairness constraints, we follow several recent papers
Agarwal et al. [2018], Kearns et al. [2018] in aiming to develop oracle efficient learning algorithms.
Oracle efficient algorithms are assumed to have access to an oracle (realized in experiments using
a heuristic — see the next section) that can solve weighted classification problems. Given access
to such an oracle, oracle efficient algorithms must run in polynomial time. We show that our
fairness constrained learning problem is computationally no harder than unconstrained learning
by giving such an oracle efficient algorithm (or reduction), and show moreover that its guarantees
generalize from in-sample to out-of-sample in the usual way — with respect to both accuracy and
the frequency and magnitude of fairness violations. Our algorithm is simple and amenable to
implementation, and we use it in our experimental results.
Our Experimental Results Finally, we implement our algorithm and run a set of experiments
on the COMPAS recidivism prediction dataset, using fairness constraints elicited from 43 human
subjects. We establish that our algorithm converges quickly (even when implemented with fast
learning heuristics, rather than “oracles”). We also explore the Pareto curves trading off error and
fairness violations for different human judges, and find empirically that there is a great deal of
variability across subjects in terms of their conception of fairness, and in terms of the degree to
which their expressed preferences are in conflict with accurate prediction. Finally we find that
most of the difficulty in balancing accuracy with the elicited fairness constraints can be attributed
to a small fraction of the reported constraints.
1.2 Related work
Dwork et al. [2012] first proposed the notion of individual metric-fairness that we take inspira-
tion from, imagining fairness as a Lipschitz constraint on a randomized algorithm, with respect to
some “task-specific metric” to be provided to the algorithm designer. Since the original proposal,
the question of where the fairness metric should come from has been one of the primary obstacles
to its adoption, and the focus of subsequent work. Zemel et al. [2013] attempt to automatically
learn a representation for the data (and hence, implicitly, a similarity metric) that causes a clas-
sifier to label an equal proportion of two protected groups as positive. They provide a heuristic
approach and an experimental evaluation. Kim et al. [2018] consider a group-fairness like re-
laxation of individual metric-fairness, asking that on average, individuals in pre-specified groups
are classified with probabilities proportional to the average distance between individuals in those
groups. They show how to learn such classifiers given access to an oracle which can evaluate the
distance between two individuals according to the metric. Compared to our work, they assume
the existence of an exact fairness metric which can be accessed using a quantitative oracle, and
they use this metric to define a statistical rather than individual notion of fairness. Most related
to our work, Gillen et al. [2018] assumes access to an oracle which simply identifies fairness vio-
lations across pairs of individuals. Under the assumption that the oracle is exactly consistent with
a metric in a simple linear class, Gillen et al. [2018] gives a polynomial time algorithm to com-
pete with the best fair policy in an online linear contextual bandits problem. In contrast to the
unrealistic assumptions that Gillen et al. [2018] is forced to make in order to derive a polynomial
time algorithm (consistency with a simple class of metrics), we make essentially no assumptions
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at all on the structure of the “fairness” constraints. Ilvento [2019] studies the problem of metric
learning with the goal of using only a small number of numeric valued queries, which are hard for
human beings to answer, relying more on comparison queries. Finally, Rothblum and Yona [2018]
prove similar generalization guarantees to ours in the context of individual-metric fairness. In the
setting that they consider, the metric fairness constraint is given.
2 Problem formulation
Let S denote a set of labeled examples {zi = (xi , yi)}ni=1, where xi ∈ X is a feature vector and yi ∈ Y
is a label. We will also write SX = {xi}ni=1 and SY = {yi}ni=1. Throughout the paper, we will restrict
attention to binary labels, so let Y = {0,1}. Let P denote the unknown distribution over X ×Y . Let
H denote a hypothesis class containing binary classifiers h : X → Y . We assume that H contains a
constant classifier (which will imply that the “fairness constrained” ERM problem that we define
is always feasible). We’ll denote classification error of hypothesis h by err(h,P ) := Pr(x,y)∼P (h(x) , y)
and its empirical classification error by err(h,S) := 1n
∑n
i=11(h(xi) , yi).
We assume there is a set of one or more judges U , such that each judge u ∈ U is identified with
a set of pairs of individuals Cu ⊆ X 2 that she thinks should be “treated similarly” i.e. ideally that
for the learned classifier h, h(x) = h(x′) (we will ask that this hold in expectation if the classifier
is randomized, and will relax it in various ways). For each pair (x,x′), let wx,x′ be the fraction of
judges who would like individual x and x′ to be treated similarly – that is wx,x′ =
|{u|(x,x′)∈Cu}|
|U | . Note
that wx,x′ = wx′ ,x.
In practice, we will not have direct access to the sets of pairs Cu corresponding to the judges
u, but we may ask them whether particular pairs are in this set (see Section 5 for details about
how we actually query human subjects). We model this by imagining that we present each judge
with a random set of pairs A ⊆ [n]22, and for each pair (xi ,xj ), ask if the pair should be treated
similarly or not; we learn the set of pairs in A∩Cu for each u. Define the empirical constraint set
Cˆu = {(xi ,xj ) ∈ Cu}∀(i,j)∈A and wˆxixj = |{u|(x,x
′)∈Cˆu}|
|U | , if (i, j) ∈ A and 0 otherwise. For simplicity, we
will sometimes write wij instead of wxi ,xj . Note that wˆij = wij for every (i, j) ∈ A.
Our goal will be to find the distribution over classifiers from H that minimizes classifica-
tion error, while satisfying the judges’ fairness requirement C. To do so, we’ll try to find D, a
probability distribution over H, that minimizes the training error and satisfy the judges’ em-
pirical fairness constraints, Cˆ. For convenience, we denote D’s expected classification error as
err(D,P ) := Eh∼D [err(h,P )] and likewise its expected empirical classification error as err(D,S) :=
Eh∼D [err(h,S)]. We say that any distribution D over classifiers satisfies (γ,η)-approximate subjec-
tive fairness if it is a feasible solution to the following constrained empirical risk minimization
problem:
2We will always assume that this pair set is closed under symmetry
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min
D∈∆H,αij≥0
err(D,S) (1)
such that ∀(i, j) ∈ [n]2 : E
h∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
≤ αij +γ (2)∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
wˆijαij
|A| ≤ η. (3)
This “Fair ERM” problem, whose feasible region we denote by Ω(S,wˆ,γ,η), has decision vari-
ables D and {αij}, representing the distribution over classifiers and the “fairness violation” terms
for each pair of training points, respectively. The parameters γ and η are constants which rep-
resent the two different “knobs” we have at our disposal to quantitatively relax the fairness con-
straint, in an `∞ and `1 sense respectively. To understand each of them, it helps to consider them
in isolation. First, imagine that we set η = 0. γ controls the worst-case disparity between the prob-
ability that any pair (xi ,xj ) ∈ Cˆ is classified as positive. (Note that although we have constraints
for every pair xi ,xj , not just those in Cˆ, because wˆi,j = 0 if (xi ,xj ) < Cˆ, a solution to the above
program is free to set the slack parameter αi,j = 1 for any such pair. When η = 0, the slack param-
eter αi,j is constrained to be 0 whenever wˆi,j > 0 — i.e. whenever (xi ,xj ) ∈ Cˆ.) Next imagine that
γ = 0. The parameter η controls the expected difference in probability that a randomly selected
pair (xi ,xj ) ∈ A is classified positively, weighted by the number of judges u who feel they should
be classified the same way — i.e. the expected degree of dissatisfaction of the panel of judges U ,
over the random choice of a pair of individuals and the randomness of their classification3.
2.1 Fairness loss
Our goal is to develop an algorithm that will minimize its empirical error err(D,S), while sat-
isfying the empirical fairness constraints Cˆ. The standard VC dimension argument states that
empirical classification error will concentrate around the true classification error, and we hope to
show the same kind of generalization for fairness as well. To do so, we first define fairness loss
here.
For some fixed randomized hypothesis D ∈ ∆H and w, define γ-fairness loss between a pair as
ΠD,w,γ ((x,x
′)) = wx,x′ max
(
0,
∣∣∣∣∣ Eh∼D [h(x)− h(x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣−γ)
For a set of pairs M ⊂ X ×X , the γ-fairness loss of M is defined to be:
ΠD,w,γ (M) =
1
|M |
∑
(x,x′)∈M
ΠD,w,γ ((x,x
′))
This is the expected degree to which the difference in classification probability for a randomly
selected pair exceeds the allowable budget γ , weighted by the fraction of judges who think that the
pair should be treated similarly. By construction, the empirical fairness loss is bounded by η (i.e.
ΠD,w,γ (M) ≤∑ij wˆijαij|A| ≤ η), and we show in Section 4, the empirical fairness should concentrate
around the true fairness loss ΠD,w,γ (P ) := Ex,x′∼P 2
[
ΠD,w,γ (x,x′)
]
.
3To see this, recall that (xi ,xj ) ∈ C⇒ (xj ,xi ) ∈ C, and so constraint 2 can be rewritten as |Eh∼D [h(xi )−h(xj )]| ≤ αij+γ ,
and wˆi,j = 0 if (i, j) < A, and so the sum in constraint 3 can equivalently be taken over A rather than [n]2.
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2.2 Cost-sensitive classification
In our algorithm, we will make use of a cost-sensitive classification (CSC) oracle. An instance
of CSC problem can be described by a set of costs {(xi , c0i , c1i )}ni=1 and a hypothesis class, H. c0i
and c1i correspond to the cost of labeling xi as 0 and 1 respectively. Invoking a CSC oracle on{(xi , c0i , c1i )}ni=1 returns a hypothesis h∗ such that
h∗ ∈ argmin
h∈H
n∑
i=1
(
h(xi)c
1
i + (1− h(xi))c0i
)
We say that an algorithm is oracle-efficient if it runs in polynomial time assuming access to a CSC
oracle.
3 Empirical risk minimization
In this section, we give an oracle-efficient algorithm for approximately solving our (in-sample)
constrained empirical risk minimization problem.
3.1 Outline of the solution
We frame the problem of solving our constrained ERM problem as finding an approximate equi-
librium of a zero-sum game between a primal player and a dual player, trying to minimize and
maximize respectively the Lagrangian of the constrained optimization problem.
The Lagrangian for our optimization problem is
L(D,α,λ,τ) = err(D,S) +
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
λij
(
E
h∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
−αij −γ
)
+ τ
 1|A| ∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
wijαij − η
 (4)
For the constraint in equation (2), corresponding to each pair of individuals (xi ,xj ), we intro-
duce a dual variable λij . For the constraint (3), we introduce a dual variable τ . The primal player’s
action space is (D,α) ∈ (∆H, [0,1]n2), and the dual player’s action space is (λ,τ) ∈ (Rn2 ,R).
Solving our constrained ERM problem equivalent to finding a minmax equilibrium of L:
argmin
(D,α)∈Ω(S,wˆ,γ,η)
err(D,S) = argmin
D∈∆H,α∈[0,1]n2
max
λ∈Rn2 ,τ∈R
L(D,α,λ,τ)
Because L is linear in terms of its parameters, Sion’s minimax theorem [Sion et al., 1958] gives
us
min
D∈∆H,α∈[0,1]n2
max
λ∈Rn2 ,τ∈R
L(D,α,λ,τ) = max
λ∈Rn2 ,τ∈R
min
D∈∆H,α∈[0,1]n2
L(D,α,λ,τ).
By a classic result of Freund and Schapire [1996], one can compute an approximate equilib-
rium by simulating “no-regret” dynamics between the primal and dual player. Our algorithm can
be viewed as simulating the following no-regret dynamics between the primal and the dual players
over T rounds. Over each of the rounds, the dual player updates dual variables {λ,τ} according
to no-regret learning algorithms (exponentiated gradient descent [Kivinen and Warmuth, 1997]
and online gradient descent [Zinkevich, 2003] respectively). At every round, the primal player
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then best responds with a pair {D,α} using a CSC oracle. The time-averaged play of both play-
ers converges to an approximate equilibrium of the zero-sum game, where the approximation is
controlled by the regret of the dual player.
3.2 Primal player’s best response
In each round t, given the actions chosen by the dual player
(
λt , τ t
)
, the primal player needs to
best respond by choosing
(
Dt ,αt
)
such that(
Dt ,αt
)
∈ argmin
D∈∆H,α∈[0,1]n2
L
(
D,α,λt , τ t
)
.
We do so by leveraging a CSC oracle. Given λt, we can set the costs as follows
c0i =
1
n
Eh∼D [1(yi , 0)] and c1i =
1
n
Eh∼D [1(yi , 1)] +
(
λtij −λtji
)
.
Then, Dt = ht = CSC({(xi , c0i , c1i )}ni=1) (we note that the best response is always a deterministic
classifier ht). As for αt, we set αtij = 1 if τ
t wij
|A| −λtij ≤ 0 and 0 otherwise.
Algorithm 1 Best Response, BESTρ(λ,τ), for the primal player
Input: training examples S = {xi , yi}ni=1, λ ∈Λ, τ ∈ T , CSC oracle CSC
for i = 1, . . . ,n do
if yi = 0 then
Set c0i = 0
Set c1i =
1
n +
∑
j,i λij −λji
else
Set c0i =
1
n
Set c1i =
∑
j,i λij −λji
D = CSC(S,c)
for (i, j) ∈ [n]2 do
αij =
1 : τ
wij
|A| −λij ≤ 0
0 : τ
wij
|A| −λij > 0.
Output: D,α
Lemma 3.1. For fixed λ,τ , the best response optimization for the primal player is separable, i.e.
argmin
D,α
L(D,α,λ,τ) = argmin
D
Lρ1λ,τ (D)× argmin
α
Lρ2λ,τ (α),
where
Lρ1λ,τ (D) = err(h,D) +
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
λij E
h∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
and
Lρ2λ,τ (α) =
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
λij
(
−αij
)
+ τ
 1|A| ∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
wijαij

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Proof. First, note that α is not dependent on D and vice versa. Thus, we may separate the opti-
mization argminD,αL as such:
argmin
D,α
L(D,α,λ,τ)
= argmin
D,α
err(D,S) +
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
λij
(
E
h∼D
[h(xi)− h(xj )]−αij −γ
)
+ τ
 1|A| ∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
wijαij − η

= argmin
D
err(D,S) +
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
λij E
h∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
×
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
λij
(
−αij
)
+ τ
 1|A| ∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
wijαij

= argmin
D
Lρ1λ,τ (D)× argmin
α
Lρ2λ,τ (α)
Lemma 3.2. For fixed λ and τ , the output α from BESTρ(λ,τ) minimizes Lρ2λ,τ
Proof. The optimization
argmin
α
Lρ2λ,τ = argmin
α
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
λij
(
−αij
)
+ τ
 1|A| ∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
wijαij

= argmin
α
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
−λijαij +
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
τ
wij
|A| αij
= argmin
α
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
αij
(
τ
wij
|A| −λij
)
.
Note that for any pair (i, j) ∈ [n]2, the term αij ∈ [0,1]. Thus, when the constant τ wij|A| −λij ≤ 0,
we assign αij as the maximum bound, 1, in order to minimize Lρ2 . Otherwise, when τ
wij
|A| −λij > 0,
we assign αij as the minimum bound, 0.
Lemma 3.3. For fixed λ and τ , the output D from BESTρ(λ,τ) minimizes Lρ1λ,τ
Proof.
argmin
D
Lρ1λ,τ = argmin
D
err(D,S) +
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
λij E
h∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
= argmin
D
1
n
n∑
i=1
Eh∼D [1(h(xi) , yi)] +
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
λij E
h∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
= argmin
D
n∑
i=1
1nEh∼D [1(h(xi) , yi)] +∑
j,i
λijh(xi)−
∑
j,i
λjih(xi)

= argmin
D
n∑
i=1
1nEh∼D [1(h(xi) , yi)] +∑
j,i
h(xi)
(
λij −λji
) .
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For each i ∈ [n], we assign the cost
c
h(xi )
i =
1
n
Eh∼D [1(h(xi) , yi)] + h(xi)
(
λij −λji
)
.
Note that the cost depends on whether yi = 0 or 1. For example, take yi = 1 and h(xi) = 0. The cost
c
h(xi )
i = c
0
i =
1
n
Eh∼D [1(h(xi) , yi)] +
∑
j,i
h(xi)
(
λij −λji
)
=
1
n
· 1 +
∑
j,i
0 ·
(
λij −λji
)
=
1
n
3.3 Dual player’s no regret updates
In order to reason about convergence we need to restrict the dual player’s action space to lie within
a bounded `1 ball, defined by the parameters Cτ and Cλ that appear in our theorem — and serve
to trade off running time with approximation quality:
Λ =
{
λ ∈Rn2+ : ‖λ‖1 ≤ Cλ
}
,T = {τ ∈R+ : ‖τ‖1 ≤ Cτ } .
The dual player will use exponentiated gradient descent [Kivinen and Warmuth, 1997] to update
λ and online gradient descent [Zinkevich, 2003] to update τ , where the reward function will be de-
fined as: rλ
(
λt
)
=
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2 λtij
(
Eh∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
−αij −γ
)
and rλ
(
τ t
)
= τ t
(
1
|A|
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2wijαij − η
)
.
Algorithm 2 No-Regret Dynamics
Input: training examples {xi , yi}ni=1, bounds Cλ and Cτ , time horizon T , step sizes µλ and{µtτ }t=1T ,
Set θ01 = 0 ∈Rn
2
Set τ0 = 0
for t = 1,2, . . . ,T do
Set λtij = Cλ
expθt−1ij
1+
∑
i′ ,j′∈[n]2 expθ
t−1
i′ j′
for all pairs (i, j) ∈ [n]2
Set τ t = proj[0,Cτ ]
(
τ t−1 +µtτ
(
1
|A|
∑
i,jwijα
t−1
ij − η
))
Dt ,αt← BESTρ(λt , τ t)
for (i, j) ∈ [n]2 do
θtij = θ
t−1
ij +µ
t−1
λ
(
Eh∼Dt
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
−αtij −γ
)
Output: 1T
∑T
t=1D
t
Lemma 3.4. Running online gradient descent for τ t, i.e. τ t = proj[0,Cτ ]
(
τ t−1 +µt−1 · ∇Lψ2Dt ,αt
(
τ t−1
))
,
with step size µt = Cτ√
T
yields the following regret
max
τ∈T
T∑
t=1
Lψ2Dt ,αt (τ)−
T∑
t=1
Lψ2Dt ,αt
(
τ t
)
≤ Cτ
√
T .
9
Proof. First, note that ∇Lψ2Dt ,αt
(
τ t−1
)
= 1W
∑
ijwijα
t−1
ij − η and
τ t = proj[0,Cτ ]
τ t−1 +µtτ
 1W ∑
ij
wijα
t−1
ij − η

 .
From Zinkevich [2003], we find that the regret of this online gradient descent (translated into
the terms of our paper) is bounded as follows:
max
τ∈T
T∑
t=1
Lψ2Dt ,αt (τ)−
T∑
t=1
Lψ2Dt ,αt
(
τ t
)
≤ C
2
τ
2µTτ
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∇Lψ2D,α∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
T∑
t=1
µtτ , (5)
where the bound on our target τ term is Cτ , the gradient of our cost function at round t is
∇Lψ2Dt ,αt
(
τ t−1
)
, and the bound
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∇Lψ2D,α∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = supτ∈T , t∈[T ] ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∇Lψ2Dt ,αt (τ t−1)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ . To prove the above lemma,
we first need to show that this bound
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∇Lψ2D,α∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1.
Since wij ,αij ,η ∈ [0,1] for all pairs (i, j), the Lagrangian 1|A|
∑
ijwijαij − η =
∑
ij wijαij
|A| − η ≤ 1. For
all t, the gradient ∣∣∣∣∇Lψ2Dt ,αt (τ t−1)∣∣∣∣ =
∑
ijwijα
t−1
ij
|A| − η ≤ 1.
Thus, ∣∣∣∣∇Lψ2D,α∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1.
Note that if we define µtτ =
Cτ√
T
, then the summation of the step sizes is equal to
T∑
t=1
µtτ = Cτ
√
T
Substituting these two results into inequality (5), we get that the regret
max
τ∈T
T∑
t=1
Lψ2Dt ,αt (τ)−
T∑
t=1
Lψ2Dt ,αt
(
τ t
)
≤ C
2
τ
2
(
Cτ /
√
T
) + 1
2
Cτ
√
T = Cτ
√
T
Lemma 3.5. Running exponentiated gradient descent for λt yields the following regret:
max
λ∈Λ
T∑
t=1
Lψ1Dt ,αt (λ)−
T∑
t=1
Lψ1Dt ,αt
(
λt
)
≤ 2Cλ
√
T logn.
Proof. In each round, the dual player gets to charge either some (i, j) constraint or no constraint at
all. In other words, he is presented with n2 +1 options. Therefore, to account for the option of not
charging any constraint, we define vector λ′ = (λ,0), where the last coordinate, which will always
be 0, corresponds to the option of not charging any constraint.
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Next, we define the reward vector ζt for λ′t as
ζt =
( E
h∼Dt
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
−αtij −γ
)
i,j∈[n]2
,0
 .
Hence, the reward function is
r(λ′t) = ζt ·λ′t = Lψ1Dt ,αt
(
λt
)
.
The gradient of the reward function is
∇r(λ′t) =
((
∇r(λt)
)
i,j∈[n2] ,0
)
=
(
ζt ,0
)
Note that the `∞ norm of the gradient is bounded by 1, i.e.∣∣∣∣∣∣∇r(λ′t)∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ ≤ 1
because for any t, each respective component of the gradient, E
h∼Dt
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
−αtij−γ , is bounded
by 1.
Here, by the regret bound of Kivinen and Warmuth [1997], we obtain the following regret
bound:
max
λ∈Λ
T∑
t=1
Lψ1Dt ,αt (λ)−
T∑
t=1
Lψ1Dt ,αt
(
λt
)
≤ logn
µ
+µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣λ′∣∣∣∣∣∣2
1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∇r(λ′)∣∣∣∣∣∣2∞T ≤ lognµ +µC2λT .
If we take µ = 1Cλ
√
logn
T , the regret is bounded as follows:
max
λ∈Λ
T∑
t=1
Lψ1Dt ,αt (λ)−
T∑
t=1
Lψ1Dt ,αt
(
λt
)
≤ 2Cλ
√
T logn.
3.4 Guarantee
Now, we appeal to Freund and Schapire [1996] to show that our no-regret dynamics converge to
an approximate minmax equilibrium of L. Then, we show that an approximate minmax equilib-
rium corresponds to an approximately optimal solution to our original constrained optimization
problem.
Theorem 3.6 (Freund and Schapire [1996]). Let (D1,α1), . . . , (DT ,αT ) be the primal player’s sequence
of actions, and (λ1, τ1), . . . , (λT , τT ) be the dual player’s sequence of actions. Let D¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1D
t, α¯ =
1
T
∑T
t=1α
t, λ¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1λ
t, and τ¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1 τ
t. Then, if the regret of the dual player satisfies
max
λ∈Λ,τ∈T
T∑
t=1
L
(
Dt ,αt ,λt , τ t
)
−
T∑
t=1
L
(
Dt ,αt ,λt , τ t
)
≤ ξψT ,
and the primal player best responds in each round (Dt ,αt = argmaxD∈∆(H),α∈[0,1]n2 L
(
D,α,λt , τ t
)
), then(
D¯, α¯, λ¯, τ¯
)
is an ξψ-approximate solution
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Remark 3.7. If the primal learner’s approximate best response satisfies
T∑
t=1
L
(
Dt ,αt ,λt , τ t
)
− min
D∈∆(H),α∈[0,1]n2
T∑
t=1
L
(
D,α,λt , τ t
)
≤ ξρT
along with dual player’s regret of ξρT , then
(
D¯, α¯, λ¯, τ¯
)
is an
(
ξρ + ξψ
)
-approximate solution
Theorem 3.8. Let
(
Dˆ, αˆ, λˆ, τˆ
)
be a v-approximate solution to the Lagrangian problem. More specifically,
L
(
Dˆ, αˆ, λˆ, τˆ
)
≤ min
D∈∆(H),α∈[0,1]n2
L
(
D,α, λˆ, τˆ
)
+ v,
and
L
(
Dˆ, αˆ, λˆ, τˆ
)
≥ max
λ∈Λ,τ∈T
L
(
Dˆ, αˆ,λ,τ
)
− v.
Then, err(Dˆ,S) ≤OPT +2v. And as for the constraints, Eh∼Dˆ
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
≤ αˆij+γ+ 1+2vCλ ,∀(i, j) ∈
[n]2 and 1|A|
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2 wˆij αˆij ≤ η + 1+2vCτ .
Proof. Let (D∗,α∗) = argmin(D,α)∈Ω(S,wˆ,γ,η) err(D,S), the optimal solution to the Fair ERM. Also,
define
penaltyS,w (D,α,λ,τ) :=
∑
(i,j)
λij
(
E
h∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
−αij −γ
)
+ τ
 1|A|∑
(i,j)
wˆijαij − η
 .
Note that for any D and α, maxλ∈Λ,τ∈T penaltyS,wˆ(D,α,λ,τ) ≥ 0 because one can always set
λ = 0 and τ = 0.
max
λ∈Λ,τ∈T
L
(
Dˆ, αˆ,λ,τ
)
≤ L
(
Dˆ, αˆ, λˆ, τˆ
)
+ v
≤ min
D∈∆(H),α∈[0,1]n2
L
(
D,αλˆ, τˆ
)
+ 2v
≤ L
(
D∗,α∗, λˆ, τˆ
)
+ 2v
= err (D∗,S) + penaltyS,wˆ
(
D∗,α∗, λˆ, τˆ
)
+ 2v
≤ err (D∗,S) + 2v
The first inequality and the third inequality are from the definition of v-approximate saddle
point, and the second to last equality comes from the fact that D∗, a∗ is a feasible solution.
Now, we consider two cases when
(
Dˆ, αˆ
)
is a feasible solution and when it’s not.
1.
(
Dˆ, αˆ
)
∈Ω (S,wˆ,γ,η)
In this case, maxλ∈Λ,τ∈T penaltyS,wˆ
(
Dˆ, αˆ,λ,τ
)
= 0 because by the definition of being a feasible
solution,
E
h∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
≤ αij +γ,∀(i, j) ∈ [n]2
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and
1
|A|
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
wˆijαij ≤ η.
Hence, maxλ∈Λ,τ∈T L
(
Dˆ, αˆ,λ,τ
)
= err
(
Dˆ,S
)
. Therefore, we have err
(
Dˆ,S
)
≤ err (D∗,S) + 2v.
2.
(
Dˆ, αˆ
)
<Ω (S,wˆ,γ,η)
maxλ∈Λ,τ∈T L
(
Dˆ, αˆ,λ,τ
)
= err
(
Dˆ,S
)
+maxλ∈Λ,τ∈T penaltyS,wˆ
(
Dˆ, αˆ,λ,τ
)
. Therefore, err
(
Dˆ,S
)
≤
err (D∗,S) + 2v because maxλ∈Λ,τ∈T penaltyS,wˆ
(
Dˆ, αˆ,λ,τ
)
≥ 0.
Now, we show that even when (Dˆ, αˆ) is not a feasible solution, the constraints are violated
only by so much.
max
λ∈Λ,τ∈T
L(Dˆ, αˆ,λ,τ) = err(Dˆ,S) + max
λ∈Λ,τ∈T
penaltyS,wˆ(Dˆ, αˆ,λ,τ) ≤ err(D∗,S) + 2v
max
λ∈Λ,τ∈T
penaltyS,wˆ(Dˆ, αˆ, λˆ, τˆ) ≤ err(D∗,S)− err(Dˆ,S) + 2v
max
λ∈Λ,τ∈T
penaltyS,wˆ(Dˆ, αˆ, λˆ, τˆ) ≤ 1 + 2v
Let λ∗, τ∗ = BESTψ
(
Dˆ, αˆ
)
, which minimizes the function as shown in Lemma A.2 and A.3 (in
the appendix). Now, consider
∑
(i,j)
λ∗ij
(
E
h∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
−αij −γ
)
+ τ∗
 1|A|∑
(i,j)
wˆijαij − η
 ≤ 1 + 2v
Say (i∗, j∗) = argmax(i,j)∈[n2] E
h∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
−αij−γ . Note that if E
h∼D
[
h(xi∗)− h(xj∗)
]
−αi∗j∗−γ >
0, then λ∗i∗j∗ = Cτ and 0 for the other coordinates and else, it’s just a zero vector. Also, τ = Cτ
if
∑
(i,j) wˆijαij − η > 0 and 0 otherwise. Thus,
∑
(i,j)
λ∗ij
(
E
h∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
−αij −γ
)
≥ 0 and τ∗
 1|A|∑
(i,j)
wˆijαij − η
 ≥ 0
Therefore, we have
max
i,j∈[n]2
( E
h∼D
[h(xi)− h(xj )]−αij −γ) ≤ 1 + 2vCλ ,
and
1
|A|
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
wˆij αˆij ≤ η + 1 + 2vCτ
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Theorem 3.9. Fix parameters ν,Cτ ,Cλ that serve to trade off running time with approximation error.
Running Algorithm 2 for T =
(
2Cλ
√
log(n)+Cτ
ν
)2
outputs a solution (Dˆ, αˆ) with the following guarantee.
The objective value is approximately optimal:
err(Dˆ,S) ≤ min
(D,α)∈Ω(S,wˆ,γ,η)
err(D,S) + 2ν.
And the constraints are approximately satisfied: Eh∼Dˆ
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
≤ αˆij + γ + 1+2νCλ ,∀(i, j) ∈ [n]2
and 1|A|
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2 wˆij αˆij ≤ η + 1+2νCτ .
Proof. Observe that
L(D,α,λ,τ) = err(D,S) +Lψ1D,α(λ) +Lψ2D,α(τ)
By how we constructed Lψ1D,α and Lψ2D,α, combining Lemma 3.4 and 3.5 yields
max
λ∈Λ,τ∈T
T∑
t=1
L
(
Dt ,αt ,λt , τ t
)
−
T∑
t=1
L
(
Dt ,αt ,λt , τ t
)
= max
τ∈T
T∑
t=1
Lψ2Dt ,αt (τ)−
T∑
t=1
Lψ2Dt ,αt
(
τ t
)
+ max
λ∈Λ
T∑
t=1
Lψ1Dt ,αt (λ)−
T∑
t=1
Lψ1Dt ,αt
(
λt
)
≤ ξψT ,
where ξψ =
2Cλ
√
T logn+Cτ
√
T
T .
Then, theorem 3.6 tells us that D¯, α¯, λ¯, α¯ form a ξψ-approximate equilibrium, where D¯ =
1
T
∑T
t=1D
t, α¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1α
t, λ¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1λ
t, and τ¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1 τ
t. And finally, with T =
(
2Cλ
√
log(n)+Cτ
v
)2
results in ξψ = ν, Theorem 3.8 gives
err(Dˆ,S) ≤ min
(D,α)∈Ω(S,wˆ,γ,η)
err(D,S) + 2ν.
And as for the constraints,
E
h∼Dˆ
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
≤ αˆij +γ + 1 + 2νCλ ,∀(i, j) ∈ [n]
2
and
1
|A|
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
wˆij αˆij ≤ η + 1 + 2vCτ .
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4 Generalization
In this section, we show that fairness loss generalizes out-of-sample. Error generalization follows
from the standard VC-dimension bound, which — because it is a uniform convergece statement
is unaffected by the addition of fairness constraints.
Theorem 4.1 (Kearns and Vazirani [1994]). Fix some hypothesis class H and distribution P . Let
S ∼ P n be a dataset consisting of n examples {xi , yi}ni=1 sampled i.i.d. from P . Then, for any 0 < δ < 1,
with probability 1− δ, for every h ∈ H, we have
|err(h,P )− err(h,S)| ≤O

√
VCDIM(H) + log(1δ )
n

Proving that the fairness loss generalizes doesn’t follow immediately from a standard VC-
dimension argument for several reasons: it is not linearly separable, but defined as an average
over non-disjoint pairs of individuals in the sample. The difference between empirical fairness
loss and true fairness loss of a randomized hypothesis D ∈ ∆H is also a non-convex function of
the supporting hypotheses h, and so it is not sufficient to prove a uniform convergence bound
merely for the base hypotheses in our hypothesis class H. We circumvent these difficulties by
making use of an ε-net argument, together with an application of a concentration inequality, and
an application of Sauer’s lemma. Briefly, we show that with respect to fairness loss, the continuous
set of distributions over classifiers have an ε-net of sparse distributions. Using the two-sample
trick and Sauer’s lemma, we can bound the number of such sparse distributions.
4.1 Fairness Loss
At a high level, our argument proceeds as follows: using McDiarmid’s inequality, for any fixed
hypothesis, its empirical fairness loss concentrates around its expectation. This argument extends
to an infinite family of hypotheses with bounded VC-dimension via the standard two-sample
trick, together with Sauer’s lemma: the only catch is that we need to use a variant of McDiarmid’s
inequality that applies to sampling without replacement. However, proving that the fairness loss
for each fixed hypothesis h concentrates around its expectation is not sufficient to obtain the same
result for arbitrary distributions over hypotheses, because the difference between a randomized
classifier’s fairness loss and its expectation is a non-convex function of the mixture weights. To
circumvent this issue, we show that with respect to fairness loss, there is an ε-net consisting of
sparse distributions over hypotheses. Once we apply Sauer’s lemma and the two-sample trick,
there are only finitely many such distributions, and we can union bound over them.
We begin by stating the standard version of McDiarmid’s inequality:
Theorem 4.2 (McDiarmid’s Inequality). Suppose X1, . . . ,Xn are independent and f satisfies
sup
x1,...,xn,xˆi
|f (x1, . . . ,xn)− f (x1, . . . ,xi−1, xˆi ,xi+1, . . . ,xn)| ≤ ci .
Then, for any ε > 0,
Pr
X1,...,Xn
(∣∣∣∣∣∣f (X1, . . . ,Xn)− EX1,...,Xn [f (X1, . . . ,Xn)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε
)
≤ 2exp
− 2ε2∑n
i=1 c
2
i

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Lemma 4.3. Fix a randomized hypothesis D ∈ ∆H. Over the randomness of S ∼ P n, we have
Pr
S∼P n
(∣∣∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (S × S)−ES [ΠD,w,γ (S × S)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε) ≤ 2exp(−2nε2)
Proof. Define a slightly modified fairness loss function that depends on each instance instead of
pairs.
Π′D,w,γ (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) =
1
n2
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
ΠD,w,γ
(
(xi ,xj )
)
.
Note thatΠ′D,w,γ (x1, . . . ,xn) =ΠD,w,γ (S×S). The sensitivity ofΠ′D,w,γ (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) is 1n , so applying
McDiarmid’s inequality yields the above concentration.
Now, following the argument described above, we show that the difference between empir-
ical fairness loss over S × S and true fairness loss converges uniformly over D ∈ ∆H with high
probability.
Theorem 4.4. If n ≥ 2ln(2)ε2 ,
Pr
S∼P n
(
sup
D∈∆H
∣∣∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (S × S)− Ex,x′ [ΠD,w,γ (x,x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣ > ε) ≤ 8 · (e · 2nd )dk exp
(−nε2
32
)
where d is the VC-dimension of H, and k = ln(2n2)8ε2 + 1.
Proof. First, by linearity of expectation, we note thatES [ΠD,w,γ (S×S)] = Ex,x′
[
ΠD,w,γ (x,x′)
]
. Given
S, let D∗S be some randomized classifier such that
∣∣∣∣ΠD∗S ,w,γ (S × S)−Ex,x′ [ΠD∗S ,w,γ (x,x′)]∣∣∣∣ > ε; if such
hypothesis does not exist, let it be some fixed hypothesis in H. We now use the standard sym-
metrization argument, which allows us to bound the difference between the fairness loss of our
sample S and that of another independent ‘ghost’ sample S ′ = (x′1, . . . ,x′n) instead of bounding the
difference between the empirical fairness loss and its expected fairness loss.
Pr
S∼P n,S ′∼P n
(
sup
D∈∆H
∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (S × S)−ΠD,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)∣∣∣ > ε2
)
≥ Pr
S,S ′
(∣∣∣ΠD∗S ,w,γ (S × S)−ΠD∗S ,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)∣∣∣ > ε2)
≥ Pr
S,S ′
(∣∣∣∣∣ΠD∗S ,w,γ (S × S)− Ex,x′ [ΠD∗S ,w,γ (x,x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣ > ε and ∣∣∣∣∣ΠD∗,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)− Ex,x′ [ΠD∗,w,γ (x,x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε2
)
= E
S,S ′
[
1
(∣∣∣∣∣ΠD∗S ,w,γ (S × S)− Ex,x′ [ΠD∗S ,w,γ (x,x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣ > ε) ·1(∣∣∣∣∣ΠD∗,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)− Ex,x′ [ΠD∗,w,γ (x,x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε2
)]
= E
S
[
1
(∣∣∣∣∣ΠD∗S ,w,γ (S × S)− Ex,x′ [ΠD∗S ,w,γ (x,x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣ > ε) · PrS ′ |S
(∣∣∣∣∣ΠD∗,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)− Ex,x′ [ΠD∗,w,γ (x,x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε2
)]
≥ Pr
S
(∣∣∣∣∣ΠD∗S ,w,γ (S × S)− Ex,x′ [ΠD∗S ,w,γ (x,x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣ > ε)) · (1− exp(−nε22
))
≥ 1
2
Pr
S
(
sup
D∈∆H
∣∣∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (S × S)− Ex,x′ [ΠD,w,γ (x,x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣ > ε)
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We used Lemma 4.3 for the second to last inequality, and the last inequality follows from the
theorem’s condition (i.e. n ≥ 2ln(2)ε2 ) and how we defined D∗S .
Now, imagine sampling S¯ = 2n points from P , and uniformly choosing n points without re-
placement to be S and the remaining n points to be S ′. This process is equivalent to sampling n
points from P to form S and another independent set of n points from P to form S ′.
Pr
S¯,S,S ′
(
sup
D∈∆H
∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (S × S)−ΠD,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)∣∣∣ > ε2
)
=
∑
S¯
Pr
(
S¯
)
Pr
S,S ′
(
sup
D∈∆H
∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (S × S)−ΠD,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)∣∣∣ > ε2 ∣∣∣∣ S¯
)
Now, we show that the continuous set of distributions over classifiers ∆H can be approximated
by an ε′-net of sparse distributions. By sparse distribution, we mean uniform distributions over
supports of at most k, for some fixed value k: Dˆ = 1k (h1, . . . ,hk) where hi ∈ H for i ∈ [k]. Because
by Sauer’s lemma, the set of hypothesesH induces at most O(nd) distinct labellings of a dataset of
sizse n, we need to union bound over at most O(ndk) distinct sparse distributions.
Lemma 4.5. For some fixed data sample S of size n, any D ∈ ∆H can be approximated by some uniform
mixture over k := 2ln(2n
2)
ε′2 + 1 hypotheses Dˆ =
1
k {h1, . . . ,hk} such that for every (x,x′) ∈ S × S,∣∣∣∣∣∣ Eh∼D [h(x)− h(x′)]− Eh∼Dˆ [h(x)− h(x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε′ .
Proof. Fix some (x,x′) ∈ S × S. Randomly sample k hypotheses from D: {hi}ki=1 ∼ Dk . Because for
each randomly drawn hypothesis hi ∼ D, the difference in its prediction for x and x′ is exactly
Eh∼D [h(x)− h(x′)], Hoeffding’s inequality yields that
Pr
hi∼D,i∈[k]

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ Eh∼D [h(x)− h(x′)]− 1k
k∑
i=1
[
hi(x)− hi(x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > ε′
 ≤ 2exp(−2k2ε′24k
)
= 2exp
(
−kε
′2
2
)
.
However, there are n2 fixed pairs in S ×S, and if we distribute the failure property between n2
pairs and union bound over all of them, we get
Pr
hi∼D,i∈[k]
 max(x,x′)∈S×S
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ Eh∼D [h(x)− h(x′)]− 1k
k∑
i=1
[
hi(x)− hi(x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > ε′
 ≤ 2n2 exp(−kε′22
)
.
In order to achieve non-zero probability of having∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ Eh∼D [h(x)− h(x′)]− 1k
k∑
i=1
[
hi(x)− hi(x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε′ ,∀(x,x′) ∈ S × S,
we need to make sure 2n2 exp
(
− kε′22
)
< 1 or k >
2ln(2n2)
ε′2 .
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Corollary 4.6. For some fixed data sample S, any D ∈ ∆H can be approximated by a uniform mixture
of k :=
2ln(2n2)
ε′2 + 1 hypotheses Dˆ =
1
k {h1, . . . ,hk} such that∣∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (S × S)−ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε′
Proof. It simply follows from Lemma 4.5 and the fact that max
(
0,Eh∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
−γ
)
is 1-
Lipschitz in terms of Eh∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
.
Using Corollary 4.6 and Sauer’s lemma that bounds the total number of possible labelings by
H over 2n points by ( e·2nd )d , we have∑
S¯
Pr
(
S¯
)
Pr
S,S ′
(
sup
D∈∆H
∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (S × S)−ΠD,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)∣∣∣ > ε2 ∣∣∣∣ S¯
)
≤
∑
S¯
Pr
(
S¯
)
Pr
S,S ′
 sup
Dˆ∈Hk
∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)−ΠDˆ,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)∣∣∣∣ > ε2 + ε′ ∣∣∣∣ S¯

≤
∑
S¯
Pr
(
S¯
)
·
(e · 2n
d
)dk
sup
Dˆ∈Hk
Pr
S,S ′
(∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)−ΠDˆ,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)∣∣∣∣ > ε2 + ε′ ∣∣∣∣ S¯)
Now, for any Dˆ, we will try to bound the probability that the difference in fairness loss between
S and S ′ is big. We do so by union bounding over cases where both of them deviate from its mean
by too much.
If
∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)−ES |S¯ [ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)]∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε4 + ε′2 and ∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)−ES |S¯ [ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)]∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε4 +
ε′
2 , then
∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)−ΠDˆ,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε2 + ε′. In other words,
Pr
S,S ′
(∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)−ΠDˆ,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε2 + ε′ ∣∣∣∣ S¯)
≥ Pr
S,S ′
(∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)−ES |S¯ [ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)]∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε4 + ε′2 and ∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)−ES |S¯ [ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)]∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε4 + ε′2 ∣∣∣∣ S¯
)
.
Therefore, by looking at the compliment probabilities, we have
Pr
S,S ′
(∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)−ΠDˆ,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)∣∣∣∣ > ε2 + ε′ ∣∣∣∣ S¯)
≤ Pr
S,S ′
(∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)−ES |S¯ [ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)]∣∣∣∣ > ε4 + ε′2 or ∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)−ES |S¯ [ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)]∣∣∣∣ > ε4 + ε′2 ∣∣∣∣ S¯
)
≤ 2Pr
S
(∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)−ES |S¯ [ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)]∣∣∣∣ > ε4 + ε′2 ∣∣∣∣ S¯
)
.
Here, we can’t appeal to McDiarmid’s because S is sampled without replacement from S¯. How-
ever, we use the stochastic covering property to show concentration for sampling without replace-
ment [Pemantle and Peres, 2014] (a similar technique was used by Neel et al. [2018])
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Definition 4.7 (Pemantle and Peres [2014]). Z1, . . . ,Zn satisfy the stochastic covering property, if
for any I ⊂ [n] and a ≥ a′ ∈ {0,1}I coordinate-wise such that ||a′ − a||1 = 1, there is a coupling ν of
the distributions µ,µ′ of (Zj : j ∈ [n] \ I) conditioned on ZI = a or ZI = a′, respectively, such that
ν(x,y) = 0 unless x ≤ y coordinate-wise and ||x − y||1 ≤ 1.
Theorem 4.8 (Pemantle and Peres [2014]). Let (Z1, . . . ,Zn) ∈ {0,1} be random variables such that
Pr(
∑n
i=1Zi = k) = 1 and the stochastic covering property is satisfied. Let f : {0,1}n → R be an c-
Lipschitz function. Then, for any ε > 0,
Pr(|f (Z1, . . . ,Zn)−E[f (Z1, . . . ,Zn)]| ≥ ε) ≤ 2exp
( −ε2
8c2k
)
Lemma 4.9 (Neel et al. [2018]). Given a set S of n points, sample k ≤ n elements without replacement.
Let Zi = {0,1} indicate whether ith element has been chosen. Then, (Z1, . . . ,Zn) satisfy the stochastic
covering property.
Let S¯ = {x1, . . . ,x2n}. If we slightly change the definition of the fairness loss so that it depends
on the indicator variables Z1, . . . ,Z2n,
Π′′ˆ
D,w,γ,S¯
(Z1, . . . ,Z2n) =
1
n2
∑
i,j∈[2n]2
ZiZjΠDˆ,w,γ (xi ,xj ) =ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S).
We see that Π′′ˆ
D,w,γ,S¯
is 1n -Lipschitz, so by theorem 4.8 and lemma 4.9, we get
Pr
S
(∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)−ES |S¯ [ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)]∣∣∣∣ > ε4 + ε′2 ∣∣∣∣ S¯
)
≤ 2exp
−
(
ε
4 +
ε′
2
)2
8 1n2 ·n
 = 2exp
−n
(
ε
4 +
ε′
2
)2
8

Combining everything, we get
Pr
S
(
sup
D∈∆H
∣∣∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (S × S)− Ex,x′ [ΠD,w,γ (x,x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣ > ε)
≤ 2
∑
S¯
Pr
(
S¯
)
·
(e · 2n
d
)dk
sup
Dˆ∈Hk
Pr
S,S ′
(∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)−ΠDˆ,w,γ (S ′ × S ′)∣∣∣∣ > ε2 + ε′ ∣∣∣∣ S¯)
≤ 4
∑
S¯
Pr
(
S¯
)
·
(e · 2n
d
)dk
sup
Dˆ∈Hk
Pr
S
(∣∣∣∣ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)−ES |S¯ [ΠDˆ,w,γ (S × S)]∣∣∣∣ > ε4 + ε′2 ∣∣∣∣ S¯
)
≤ 8 ·
(e · 2n
d
)dk
exp
−n
(
ε
4 +
ε′
2
)2
8

For convenience, we set ε′ = ε2 .
However, in our case, instead of finding the average over all pairs in S, we calculate the fairness
loss only over m randomly chosen pairs. Fixing S, if m is sufficiently large, our empirical fairness
loss should concentrate around the fairness loss over all the pairs for S.
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Lemma 4.10. For fixed S, randomly chosen pairs M ⊂ S × S, and randomized hypothesis D,
Pr
M∼(S×S)m
(
ΠD,w,γ (M)−ΠD,w,γ (S × S) ≥ ε
)
≤ exp
(
−2mε2
)
Proof. Write a random variable La = ΠD,w,γ ((x2a−1,x2a)) for the fairness loss of the ath pair. Note
that
E[La] =
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
1
n2
ΠD,w,γ
(
(xi ,xj )
)
=ΠD,w,γ (S × S),∀a ∈ [|M |].
Therefore, by Hoeffding’s inequality, we have
Pr
M
(
ΠD,w,γ (M)−ΠD,w,γ (S × S) ≥ ε
)
≤ exp
(
−2mε2
)
.
Once again, using ε-net sparsification of ∆H, we show the above concentration converges uni-
formly over D ∈ ∆H
Lemma 4.11. For fixed S and randomly chosen pairs M ⊂ S × S,
Pr
M∼(S×S)m
(
sup
D∈∆H
∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (M)−ΠD,w,γ (S × S)∣∣∣ ≥ ε) ≤ (e · 2nd )dk
′
exp
(
−8mε2
)
,
where k′ = 2ln(2m)ε2 + 1.
Proof.
Pr
M∼(S×S)m
(
sup
D∈∆H
∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (M)−ΠD,w,γ (S × S)∣∣∣ ≥ ε)
≤ Pr
M∼(S×S)m
 sup
Dˆ∈Hk
∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (M)−ΠD,w,γ (S × S)∣∣∣ ≥ ε+ ε′
≤
∑
Dˆ∈Hk
Pr
M∼(S×S)m
(∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (M)−ΠD,w,γ (S × S)∣∣∣ ≥ ε+ ε′)
≤
(e · 2n
d
)dk
exp
(
−2m (ε+ ε′)2
)
,
where k = 2ln(2m)ε′2 + 1. The last inequality is from Corollary 4.6 and Lemma 4.10. For convenience,
we just set ε′ = ε.
Combining theorem 4.4 and lemma 4.11 yields the following theorem for fairness loss gener-
alization.
Theorem 4.12. Let S consists of n i.i.d points drawn from P and let M represent a set of m pairs
randomly drawn from S × S . Then we have:
Pr
S∼P n
M∼(S×S)m
(
sup
D∈∆H
∣∣∣∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (M)− E(x,x′)∼P 2[ΠD,w,γ (x,x′)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 2ε
)
≤
(
8 ·
(e · 2n
d
)dk
exp
(−nε2
32
)
+
(e · 2n
d
)dk′
exp
(
−8mε2
))
,
where k′ = 2ln(2m)ε2 + 1, k =
ln(2n2)
8ε2 + 1, and d is the VC-dimension of H.
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To interpret this theorem, note that the right hand side (the probability of a failure of gener-
alization) begins decreasing exponentially fast in the data and fairness constraint sample param-
eters n and m as soon as n ≥Ω(d log(n) log(n/d)) and m ≥Ω(d log(m) log(n/d)).
proof of theorem 4.12. With probability 1−
(
8 ·
(
e·2n
d
)dk
exp
(−nε2
32
)
+
(
e·2n
d
)dk′
exp
(
−8mε2
))
, where k′ =
2ln(2m)
ε2 + 1 and k =
ln(2n2)
8ε2 + 1, we have
sup
D∈∆H
∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (M)−ΠD,w,γ (S × S)∣∣∣ ≤ ε
and
sup
D∈∆H
∣∣∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (S × S)− Ex,x′[ΠD,w,γ (x,x′)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Then, by triangle inequality,
sup
D∈∆H
∣∣∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (M)− Ex,x′[ΠD,w,γ (x,x′)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2ε.
In other words, with probability
(
8 ·
(
e·2n
d
)dk
exp
(−nε2
32
)
+
(
e·2n
d
)dk′
exp
(
−8mε2
))
, we have
sup
D∈∆H
∣∣∣∣∣ΠD,w,γ (M)− Ex,x′[ΠD,w,γ (x,x′)
∣∣∣∣∣ > 2ε.
5 A Behavioral Study of Subjective Fairness: Preliminary Findings
Figure 1: Screenshot of sample subjective fairness elicitation question posed to human subjects.
The framework and algorithm we have provided can be viewed as a potentially powerful tool
for empirically studying subjective individual fairness as a behavioral phenomenon. In this section
we describe preliminary results from a human-subject study we performed in which subjective
fairness was elicited and then enforced by our algorithm.
Our study used the COMPAS recidivism data gathered by ProPublica 4 in their celebrated
analysis of Northepointe’s risk assessment algorithm Larson et al. [2019]. This data consists of
4 The data can be accessed on ProPublica’s Github page here. We cleaned the data as in the ProPublica study,
removing any records with missing data. This left 5829 records, where the base rate of two-year recidivism was 46%.
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defendants from Broward County in Florida between 2013 to 2014. For each defendant the data
consists of sex (male, female), age (18-96), race (African-American, Caucasian, Hispanic, Asian,
Native American), juvenile felony count, juvenile misdemeanor count, number of other juvenile
offenses, number of prior adult criminal offenses, the severity of the crime for which they were
incarcerated (felony or misdemeanor), as well as the outcome of whether or not they did in fact
recidivate. Recidivism is defined as a new arrest within 2 years, not counting traffic violations and
municipal ordinance violations.
We implemented our fairness framework via a web app that elicited subjective fairness notions
from 43 undergraduates at a major research university. After reading a document describing the
data and recidivism prediction task, each subject was presented with 50 randomly chosen pairs
of records from the COMPAS data set, as illustrated in Figure 5, and asked whether in their opin-
ion the two individuals should treated (predicted) equally or not. Importantly, the subjects were
shown only the features for the individuals, and not their actual recidivism outcomes, since we
sought to elicit subjects’ fairness notions regarding the predictions of those outcomes. While ab-
solutely no guidance was given to subjects regarding fairness, the elicitation framework allows
for rich possibilities. For example, subjects could choose to ignore demographic factors or crimi-
nal histories entirely if they liked, or a subject who believes that minorities are more vulnerable
to overpolicing could discount their criminal histories relative to Caucasians in their pairwise
elicitations.
For each subject, the pairs they identified to be treated equally were taken as constraints on er-
ror minimization with respect to the actual recidivism outcomes over the entire COMPAS dataset,
and our algorithm was applied to solve this constrained optimization problem, using a linear
threhsold heuristic as the underlying learning oracle (Kearns et al. [2018]). We ran our algorithm
with η = 0 and variable γ in Equations (1) through (3), which represents the strongest enforce-
ment of subjective fairness — the difference in predicted values must be at most γ on every pair
selected by a subject. Because the issues we are most interested in here (convergence, tradeoffs
with accuracy, and heterogeneity of fairness preferences) are orthogonal to generalization — and
because we prove VC-dimension based generalization theorems — for simplicity, the results we
report are in-sample.
5.1 Results
Figure 2: (a) Sample algorithm trajectory for a particular subject at γ = 0.3. (b) Sample subjective
fairness Pareto curves for a sample of subjects. (c) Scatterplot of number of constraints specified
vs. error at γ = 0.3.
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Since our algorithm relies on a learning heuristic for which worst-case guarantees are not
possible, the first empirical question is whether the algorithm converges rapidly on the behavioral
data. We found that it did so consistently; a typical example is Figure 5.1(a), where we show the
trajectory of model error vs. fairness violation for a particular subject’s data in which the allowed
violation was γ = 0.3 (horizontal line). At 2000 iterations the algorithm has saturated the allowed
violation with the constrained error-optimal model.
Perhaps the most basic behavioral questions we might ask involve the extent and nature of
subject variability. For example, do some subjects identify constraint pairs that are much harder
to satifsy than other subjects? And if so, what factors seem to account for such variation?
Figure 5.1(b) shows that there is indeed considerable variation in subject difficulty. For a
representative subset of the 43 subjects, we have plotted the error vs. fairness violation Pareto
curves obtained by varying γ from 0 (pairs selected by subjects must have identical probabilistic
predictions of recidivism) to 1.0 (no fairness enforced whatsoever). Since our model space is closed
under probabilistic mixtures, the worst-case Pareto curve is linear, obtained by all mixtures of the
error-optimal model and random predictions. Easier constaint sets are more convex. We see in the
figure that both extremes are exhibited behaviorally — some subjects yield linear or near-linear
curves, while others permit huge reductions in unfairness for only slight increases in error, and
virtually all the possibilities in between are realized as well. 5
Since each subject was presented with 50 random pairs and was free to constrain as many or
as few as they wished, it is natural to wonder if the variation in difficulty is explained simply
by the number of constraints chosen. In Figure 5.1(c) we show a scatterplot of the the number
of constraints selected by a subject (x axis) versus the error obtained (y axis) for γ = 0.3 (an
intermediate value that exhibits considerable variation in subject error rates) for all 43 subjects.
While we see there is indeed strong correlation (approximately 0.69), it is far from the case that
the number of constraints explains all the variability. For example, amongst subjects who selected
approximately 16 constraints, the resulting error varies over a range of nearly 8%, which is over
40% of the range from the optimal error (0.32) to the worst fairness-constrained error (0.5).
It is also interesting to consider the collective force of the 1432 constraints selected by all 43
subjects together, which we can view as a “fairness panel” of sorts. Given that there are already
individual subjects whose constraints yield the worst-case Pareto curve, it is unsurprising that the
collective constraints do as well. But we can exploit the flexibility of our optimization framework
in Equations (1) through constraint (3), and let γ = 0.0 and vary only η, thus giving the learner
discretion in which subjects’ constraints to discount or discard at a given budget η. In doing so we
find that the unconstrained optimal error can be obtained while having the average (exact) pair-
wise constraint be violated by only roughly 25%, meaning roughly that only 25% of the collective
constraints account for all the difficulty.
We leave the fuller investigation of our behavioral study for future work, including the de-
tailed nature of subject variability and the comparison of behavioral subjective fairness to more
standard algorithmic fairness notions.
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5The slight deviations from true convexity are due to only approximate convergence.
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A Omitted details in Section 3
A.1 Dual player’s best response
Lemma A.1. For fixed D and α, the best response optimization for the dual player is separable, i.e.
argmax
λ∈Λ,τ∈T
L(D,α,λ,τ) = argmax
λ∈Λ
Lψ1D,α(λ)× argmax
τ∈T
Lψ2D,α(τ),
where
Lψ1D,α(λ) =
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
λij
(
E
h∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
−αij −γ
)
and
Lψ2D,α(τ) = τ
 1|A| ∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
wijαij − η
 .
Proof.
argmax
λ∈Λ,τ∈T
L(D,α,λ,τ)
= argmax
λ∈Λ,τ∈T
E
h∼D
[err(h,S)] +
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
λij
(
E
h∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
−αij −γ
)
+ τ
 1|A| ∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
wijαij − η

= argmax
λ∈Λ
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
λij
(
E
h∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
−αij −γ
)
× argmax
τ∈T
τ
 1|A| ∑
(i,j)∈[n]2
wijαij − η

= argmax
λ∈Λ
Lψ1D,α(λ)× argmax
τ∈T
Lψ2D,α(τ)
Lemma A.2. For fixed D and α, the output λ from BESTψ(D,α) minimizes Lψ1D,α
Proof. Because Lψ1D,α is linear in terms of λ and the feasible region is the non-negative orthant
bounded by 1-norm, the optimal solution must include putting all the weight to the pair (i, j)
where Eh∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )−αij
]
is maximized.
2
Algorithm 3 Best Response, BESTψ(D,α), for the dual player
Input: training examples S = {xi , yi}ni=1, D ∈ ∆(H), α ∈ [0,1]n
2
λ = 0 ∈Rn2
(i∗, j∗) = argmax(i,j)∈[n]2Eh∼D
[
h(xi)− h(xj )
]
−αij −γ
if Eh∼D
[
h(xi∗)− h(xj∗)
]
−αi∗j∗ −γ ≤ 0 then
λi∗j∗ = Cλ
set τ =
0 1|A|
∑
(i,j)∈[n]2wijαij − η ≤ 0
Cτ o.w.
Output: λ,τ
Lemma A.3. For fixed D and α, the output τ from BESTψ(D,α) minimizes Lψ2D,α
Proof. Because Lψ2D,α is linear in terms of τ , the optimal solution is trivially to set τ at either Cτ or
0 depending on the sign.
3
